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Testimonies of the Ustasha Members
This article examines the defeat of the Ustasha movement and its impact 
on the way the members of the Croatian fascist movement represented 
themselves through memoirs and testimonies after the Second World War. 
The current historiography dealing with the Ustasha movement remains 
largely detached from the contemporary approaches derived from memory 
studies, which has resulted in existing research gaps related to questions 
of how, and why, the Ustashe remember their wartime activities. This paper 
is based on the analysis of 23 Ustasha memory sources; 11 testimonies and 
12 memoirs. It examines differences between Ustasha testimonies given in 
Yugoslav detention, and memoirs which were written by the Ustashe who 
managed to emigrate to other countries. Significant discrepancy in the 
narratives and structure presented in the source material is attributed 
to the different circumstances in which they were written, the expected 
audience and the variegated experiences of defeat the Ustasha members 
went through.
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For many members of the fascist Ustasha1 movement, the period of 
the Independent State of Croatia (Nezavisna Država Hrvatska, NDH) from 1941 
to 1945 was a defining point of their lives. The creation of the NDH uplifted 
the Ustashe from political margins in Yugoslavia, and those in emigration 
from exile, to the status of governing elites in a totalitarian state.2 Most of 
them experienced astonishing upward social mobility and amassed power 
by quickly attained positions in the newly emerging state, party or military 
framework of the Ustasha regime. Many Ustashe also enjoyed substantial 
economic benefits as the result of the redistribution of wealth which was 
mainly the product of genocide and ethnic cleansing conducted against 
the Serbs, Jews and Roma.3 After the defeat of the Ustasha regime and the 
downfall of the NDH in 1945, the Ustashe were faced with grim prospects for 
their future – staying in Yugoslavia meant facing certain repression from the 
Yugoslav authorities, while the other option was going back to the status of 
political exiles which many of them had already experienced in the interwar 
period.4
Numerous Ustasha members provided their interpretations of the 
roots of the downfall of the NDH in testimonies, memoires, articles and 
letters. Going beyond the military, economic and political perspective of 
the total defeat,5 this article analyzes Ustasha post-war narratives with a 
focus on various subjective experiences of the total defeat of the Ustashe. 
What factors influenced the reconstruction of their memory and how was 
it used as a space for the political reinvention of the self after the war? 
1 Ustasha (ustaša) is a singular form, while Ustashe (ustaše) is used as a plural in this paper. 
2 The Ustashe proclaimed their own ideology as totalitarian. See Danijel Crljen, Načela 
Ustaškog Pokreta [Principles of the Ustasha movement] (Zagreb, 1942), 113.
3 For standard, up-to-date, scholarly works on the genocide and mass violence in the 
Independent State of Croatia see Alexander Korb, “Understanding Ustaša Violence,” Journal 
of Genocide Research 12 (2010): 1-18. Ivo Goldstein, Slavko Goldstein, The Holocaust in Croatia 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press 2016). Tomislav Dulić, Utopias of Nation: Local 
Mass Killing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1941-42 (Uppsala: Studia Historica Upsaliensia, 2005).
4 There is an urgent need for further studies of pre-war numbers of Ustasha members and 
supporters both in Yugoslavia and in the emigration. According to current historiography the 
number of the Ustashe in the emigrant training camps in Italy and Hungary did not exceed 
500 in the interwar period. Prominent Ustasha member, Slavko Kvaternik, claimed that at 
the height of their power in the pre-war period the Ustashe numbered about 900 members. 
For more information on the number of pre-war Ustashe, see Nada Kisić-Kolanović, ed. 
Vojskovođa i politika: sjećanja Slavka Kvaternika [Army leader and politics: Memoirs of 
Slavko Kvaternik] (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, 1997), 92. Historian Jozo Tomasevich also 
estimates the number at no more than 900 sworn Ustashe in Yugoslavia at the moment of the 
proclamation of NDH, adding 200 members from Italy. Jozo Tomasevich, War and Revolution 
in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2001), 337. Matković cautiously estimates the total number of about 2000 Ustashe at the 
time when they came to power. Hrvoje Matković, Povijest Nezavisne Države Hrvatske (Zagreb: 
Naklada Pavičić, 2002), 50. The Ustashe themselves estimated that the number of their 
sympathizers was somewhere between 30 - 40 000 at the moment when they took power. 
However, the Ustasha estimates are highly problematic, due to difficulties in determining 
who can be classified as a Ustasha sympathizer. Further difficulty is in determining the 
number of sympathizers because there were no opinion polls nor did the pro-Ustashe groups 
participate in the last elections before the war. See Alexander Korb, “Understanding Ustaša 
Violence,” Journal of Genocide Research 12 (2010): 9.
5 Jenny Macleod, “Introduction,” in Defeat and Memory. Cultural Histories of Military Defeat in 
the Modern Era, ed. Jenny Macleod (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 2. 
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How did the Ustashe justify their actions, to whom and how did they try to 
present themselves, which episodes from their past did they emphasize, 
and which ones did they try to hide? These questions hold great importance 
for an understanding of the Ustasha history as well as for uncovering of 
psychological mechanisms which are used to cope with not only military, but 
also ideological and moral defeat.
In order to deepen the conceptual link between the total defeat 
and memory this article utilizes Paul Connerton’s typology of memory and 
forgetting together with John Horne’s typology of defeat.6 The process 
of distancing from the defeated (and discredited) movements, states 
and ideologies is analyzed by measuring individual’s ideological evolution 
through larger periods of time and analyzing factors which contributed to 
their shifts in attitudes. However, the analysis of testimonies and memoirs 
has its limitations, as Aleida Assman, one of the pioneer scholars of memory 
studies, noted: 
…survivors as witnesses do not, as a rule, add to our knowledge of factual 
history; their testimonies, in fact, have often proved inaccurate. This, 
however, does not invalidate them as a unique contribution to our knowledge 
of the past. Their point is less to tell us what happened than what it felt like 
to be in the center of those events; they provide very personal views from 
within.7
Although there are studies about the after-war life of the Ustasha 
members, such as Bogdan Krizman’s8 research conducted in the 1980s, and 
more recently a PhD dissertation written by Ante Delić,9 they mostly center on 
the activities of Poglavnik10 – Ante Pavelić. These authors approach the topic 
primarily through the paradigm of political history by focusing on the elites. 
They are primarily interested in empirical and chronological reconstruction 
of events and contemporary approaches from memory studies and cultural 
history were not applied in them. The cultural approach, which is applied in 
this paper, focuses on the analysis of discourse and practices of historical 
actors and discerning how they gave meaning to their lives. In other words, 
the aim is not the factual reconstruction of events, but the analysis of 
“meaning-production in the past.”11
A successful application of the cultural approach in the analysis 
of the NDH was recently conducted by Rory Yeomans who wrote about the 
ways in which the victims of the Ustasha regime, mostly Serbs and Jews, 
wrote petitions and letters to the newly established authorities in order to 
6 Paul Connerton, “Seven types of forgetting,” Memory Studies 1, no. 1 (2008): 59-71. See also 
John Horne, “Defeat and Memory in Modern History,” in Defeat and Memory: Cultural Histories 
of Military Defeat in the Modern Era, ed. Jenny Macleod (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 
11-29.
7 Aleida Assman, “History, Memory, and the Genre of Testimony,” Poetics Today 27, no. 2 (2006): 
263.
8 Bogdan Krizman, Pavelić u bjekstvu [Pavelić in Exile] (Zagreb: Globus, 1986). 
9 Ante Delić, “Djelovanje Ante Pavelića 1945.-1953. godine” [Activities of Ante Pavelić 1945-
1953] (PhD diss., Sveučilište u Zadru, 2016).
10 Poglavnik was the title used by Ante Pavelić and has the same meaning as Duce in Italian 
Fascism or Führer in German Nazism. 
11 Dan Stone, Histories of the Holocaust (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 246.
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save their lives.12 They tried to depict alternative identities to those ascribed 
to them by the Ustashe, and some reinvented their personal histories as a 
survival strategy. Much like some of the Ustasha members after the war, 
the persecuted minorities often “employed the state’s totalizing discourse 
to express a sense of belonging to the Croatian national community under 
construction.” Yeomans points out that persecuted ethnic groups in the NDH 
were “endeavoring to show that the writers had transformed themselves 
into members of the new society.”13 Yeomans opens new venues of research 
which should be further pursued when it comes to the victims of the Ustasha 
regime. However, no such study currently exists in relation to the memory 
of the Ustasha members captured by the Yugoslav authorities after the war. 
This case is especially intriguing because similar strategies of reinvention of 
the self were used by some of the captured Ustashe in order to demonstrate 
that they were ready to integrate into the new Yugoslav society. 
This article builds on the analysis of 23 Ustasha memory sources, 11 
of which are classified as testimonies and 12 are classified as memoirs. When 
it comes to Ustasha memory sources, there is a need to methodologically 
differentiate between testimonies and memoirs. For the purpose of this 
study testimonies are defined as written or oral accounts given in front of a 
body of authority - in this particular case, the security service of Yugoslavia 
which was dealing with the captured Ustashe. Testimonies of former 
Ustasha members were often given under interrogation which influenced 
their content and structure in significant ways. During the questioning, 
interrogators would ask a set of pre-determined, generic questions, but they 
would also often interrupt the narration of the Ustashe by asking for frequent 
clarifications which often broke the narrative and influenced the information 
given in the testimonies. 
For the purpose of this study memoirs are considered to be personal 
written accounts of Ustasha members that were not written under any form 
of duress. The fact that memoirs were written with more reflection and 
distance in emigration, without the threat of force significantly influenced the 
content, argumentation and values represented in them. Due to the absence 
of interrogators, the narratives in the memoirs are far more consistent than 
those presented in the testimonies. 
Both memoirs and testimonies of the Ustasha members were 
significantly shaped by the expectation of who was to be the prospective 
audience. Unlike testimonies, which were written primarily for the audience 
of Yugoslav authorities, Ustasha memoirs were written primarily for the 
audience of the Croatian émigré community, like-minded nationalists, or 
future Croatian generations.
The Ustasha Testimonies and the Total Defeat
As the Second World War in Europe was coming to a close, the 
Ustasha movement, together with the NDH, shared the fate of its Axis allies. 
The collapse of the Axis war effort, coupled with an increasingly powerful 
12 See Rory Yeomans, “In Search of Myself: Autobiography, Imposture, and Survival in Wartime 
Croatia,”  S:I.M.O.N. – Shoah: Intervention, Methods, Documentation 4 (2017): 21-39. 
13 Yeomans, “In Search of Myself,” 22.
172
#1  /  2019  h istory  in  flu x  pp.  167-184
and popular Partisan movement on the territory of the NDH, brought the 
total defeat of the Ustasha. The bulk of the Ustasha forces attempted a 
retreat through Slovenia in order to surrender to the British forces situated 
in Austria. This was done in order to avoid being captured by the communist-
led Yugoslav Partisans who had led an uncompromising struggle against the 
Croatian Ustashe, Serbian Chetniks and their Axis allies. An estimated 75 
000 NDH soldiers, followed by about 45 000 civilians, tried to reach Austria, 
however, the majority was forced to turn around and ended up in Partisan 
hands.14 Many of the captured Ustashe and NDH soldiers, as well as civilians, 
were subjected to retributive political violence and mass executions by the 
Partisan units. 
Immediately after the war, the Yugoslav regime, headed by Josip 
Broz Tito, launched a campaign of “repressive erasure” through which all 
remnants of the fascist Ustasha regime were exorcised.15 This was not only 
done on a symbolic level, but also involved a general ban of political rights and 
public service for the Ustashe and their collaborators, as well as episodes of 
mass murder. Only in 1947 there were more than 10 000 convictions by the 
Yugoslav courts for offenses “against the state and the people.”16 Many of 
those convicted were the Ustashe who returned to Yugoslavia, or stayed in 
the country after the war, in order to organize terrorist cells with the aim of 
overthrowing the Yugoslav regime. According to estimates, there were up 
to 4 000 members of Croatian right-wing guerilla fighters in Yugoslavia in 
between 1945 and 1947.17 These pro-Ustasha and right-wing guerilla groups 
ultimately failed to mount serious resistance and mobilize mass support 
against Yugoslavia. Most of them were captured by the Yugoslav authorities 
and questioned about their activities and affiliation during the NDH period. 
The Ustashe who were captured by the Yugoslav regime had 
to face the consequences of total defeat which is characterized by the 
“reconstruction of the vanquished according to the political values and 
economic systems of the victors.”18 However, the Ustashe were not primarily 
defeated in an inter-state war, but in a civil war, which brought about 
additional difficulties for the vanquished. According to Horne, the defeat in 
civil war often requires total submission to the will and power of the victors. 
Those who are defeated in civil wars often face a choice: they either have 
to flee the country or they have to completely submit to the values, norms 
and expectations of the victors. The military and political defeat of the 
Ustasha regime and the downfall of the NDH also dealt a serious blow to the 
established myths of the Ustasha movement; for many of those who were 
14 Martina Grahek Ravančić, Bleiburg i križni put 1945. Historiografija, publicistika i memoarska 
literatura [Bleiburg and the Death Marches: Historiography, journalism and memoirs] 
(Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2009), 324-325. 
15 For the concept of “Repressive Erasure” see Paul Connerton, “Seven types of forgetting,” 
Memory Studies 1, no. 1 (2008): 60. 
16 Katarina Spehnjak and Tihomir Cipek, “Disidenti, opozicija i otpor – Hrvatska i Jugoslavija 
1945.- 1990.” [Dissidents, opposition and resistance – Croatia and Yugoslavia 1945-1990], 
Časopis za suvremenu povijest 39, no. 2 (2007): 264. 
17 Zdenko Radelić, Križari: Gerila u Hrvatskoj 1945-1950 [Crusaders: Guerilla in Croatia 1945-
1959]. Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2002, 120. 
18 Horne, “Defeat and Memory in Modern History,” 14.
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captured by the Yugoslav authorities, the Ustasha movement and its ideology 
were completely defeated and therefore delegitimized. 
In order to distance themselves from the crimes of the Ustasha 
regime, and to alleviate their responsibilities, some Ustashe captured by 
the Yugoslav authorities started to rely on the argument that Pavelić was 
a manipulative despotic ruler who had tainted the purity of the Ustasha 
revolution. Vladimir Židovec, ambassador of the NDH to Bulgaria and an 
official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,19 testified in front of the Yugoslav 
authorities that “for a long time the actions and personality traits of Ante 
Pavelić were a mystery to me. At first, I could not explain many of his steps. 
Only after we emigrated could I connect different threads and create a 
well rounded up picture.”20 Židovec argues that the key to Pavelić’s power 
throughout the existence of the NDH was the fact that he ruled through the 
philosophy of “divide et impera.”21 According to Židovec many other high-
ranking Ustashe also shared his opinion. Some of them told him that Pavelić 
was against any sort of hierarchical organization, and that he rejected 
establishing a typical institutional framework, supported by the rule of law.22 
The wartime leader of the Ustasha Youth, Ivan Oršanić,23 depicted Pavelić as 
a Byzantine type of ruler, who is guided by “Balkan arrogance, dishonesty, 
cunningness and contempt for people in whom he only sees his toys.”24 
The idea of the despotic ruler of the “eastern type” draws from a 
long tradition of Orientalization of the Balkans among the members of the 
Croatian far-right. Ever since the second half of the 19th century they argued 
that Croatia always belonged to the West, while the rest of the Balkans were 
under the prolonged influence of the Byzantine Empire, and subsequently 
the Ottoman Empire – this allegedly resulted in a development of a particular 
kind of mentality which was marked by immortality, corruption, violence, 
political manipulation, assassination, etc.25 By projecting the despotic ruler 
of the “eastern type” onto Pavelić the Ustashe tried to pin all the responsibility 
for the war crimes and the defeat on to him and his inner circle. 
Another argument used by the Ustasha members to explain the fall 
of the NDH was the stab in the back conspiracy theory. The argument exists 
in two distinct forms, one is closely connected to the despotic ruler argument 
and it can be reduced to internal or domestic treason, while the other form of 
the argument puts the international element in the form of Axis in the center 
19 See Zdravko Dizdar, et al., Tko je tko u NDH. Hrvatska: 1941-1945. [Who is who in the 
Independent State of Croatia 1941-1945] (Zagreb: Minerva, 1997), 435.
20 HR-HDA-1561, SDS (Služba Državne Sigurnosti – State Security Service), RSUP (Republički 
Sekretarijat za Unutrašnje Poslove), SRH (Socijalističke Republike Hrvatske), 013.0.56. 
(Vladimir Židovec), 118.
21 Ibid, 126. 
22 HR-HDA-1561, SDS, RSUP SRH, 013.0.56 (Vladimir Židovec), 121. 
23 Ivan Oršanić (1904-1968) was a prominent Ustasha intellectual, during the NDH he was 
heading the Ustasha Youth. See Dizdar et al., Tko je tko u NDH, 302-303.
24 HR-HDA-1561, SDS, RSUP SRH, 013.0.56 (Vladimir Židovec), 122-123.
25 Ante Starčević, Iztočno pitanje, (Zagreb: Tisak “Prve hrvatsk radničke tiskare, 1899). The 
reprint of the text can be found in Pavo Barišić, ed., Ante Starčević: Izabrani Politički Spisi 
[Ante Starčević: Selected Political Writings] (Zagreb: Golden Marketing, Narodne Novine, 
1999), 235. For instances of Pavelić’s Orientalization of the Balkans see Ante Pavelić, 
Doživljaji [Experiences] (Zagreb: Despot Infinitus, 2015), 132-135. 
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of treasonous behavior. However, unlike the despotic ruler interpretation 
which does not fully consider the broader implications nor the larger group 
dynamic, internal treason argument is more inclusive in terms of variety of 
agents.  For example, a member of the Ustasha elite who was captured after 
the war, Mile Budak,26 claimed that 
to all questions which were asked related to the persecution, mass slaughter, 
torture or any other kind of maltreatment [of minorities], and especially with 
destruction against the people and their property in Croatia I can say the 
following: there were a few people, who worked against the intentions of the 
government members and they were not subjected to any specific ministry. 
They did whatever they wanted on their own, and did not answer to anyone, 
besides, I suppose, to Poglavnik.27
Reinvention of the Self
The policy of “brotherhood and unity” (bratstvo i jedinstvo) was one 
of the cornerstones of Yugoslav regime’s ideology. “Prescriptive forgetting” 
is directly derived from it – the multiethnic community of Yugoslavia was 
encouraged to transcend past national conflicts and focus on positive images 
of the antifascist struggle (Narodnooslobodilačka borba, NOB) in which every 
ethnic group could find a positive image of integration into the new state 
and its dominant ideology.28 Political prisoners and war criminals were also 
partially targeted by the policy of the “brotherhood and unity.” The Yugoslav 
press encouraged the Ustashe to admit their own guilt, repent in front of the 
Yugoslav authorities, and through it ensure the possibility of reintegration 
into the Yugoslav society. Yugoslav press wrote about “collaborators” who 
repented and were given lower sentences under the justification that they 
could contribute to the future of the community.29 However, these invitations 
for the admission of guilt in exchange for reintegration into the society were 
highly selective at best. Higher ranking Ustasha officials such as prominent 
ideologues, leaders of military or party institutions or those known for their 
participation in mass atrocities were aware that they would never be given a 
chance to integrate in the new Yugoslav society. Prisoners such as Mile Budak 
were fully aware that they would be executed because of their profile.30 
The Ustasha prisoners of middle rank hoped that their limited 
exposure in the Ustasha media, lack of direct involvement in the mass 
atrocities or front-line combat service would provide them with a chance 
to evade death sentences. They tried to reinvent their political biographies 
in order to convince the Yugoslav authorities that they never believed in the 
Ustasha ideology, that they covertly opposed it, or that they abandoned it 
26 Mile Budak (1889-1945) was a prominent pre-war writer and politician, Ustasha ideologue, 
and a minister holding multiple offices in the Independent State of Croatia. For more on 
Budak see Dizdar, Tko je tko u NDH, 53-55.
27 HR-HDA-1561, SDS, RSUP SRH, 013.0.52. (Mile Budak), 22. 
28 For the concept of “Prescriptive Forgetting” see Connerton, “Seven Types of Forgetting,” 61. 
29 Ana Jura, “Komunistička represija u Hrvatskoj prema pisanju Vjesnik, svibanj – kolovoz 1945. 
godine” [Communist repression in Croatia according to the writings of Vjesnik, May – August 
1945], Časopis za suvremenu povijest 44, no. 1 (2012): 66. 
30 Nada Kisić-Kolanović, “Vrijeme političke represije: ‘veliki sudski procesi’ u Hrvatskoj 1945.-
1948.” [Time of political repression: ‘Great Court Proceedings’ in Croatia 1945-1948], Časopis 
za suvremenu povijest 25, no. 1 (1993): 10. 
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immediately after the war. They intentionally rearranged their biographies in 
accordance to the expectations of the new Yugoslav regime in order to fit the 
new ideological paradigm. 
For example, Vladimir Košak,31 the Minister of Finance of the NDH 
government, argued that he was “convinced to this day, that from an economic 
standpoint I provided all the possible resistance to the Germans and Italians, 
if there were any concessions given to them, they were insignificant and 
they were given only to refute their higher and bigger requests.”32 Košak 
also tried to adjust his wartime record to the projected expectations of the 
communists by arguing that he always believed that the economy should be 
nationalized and that it should be in the “people’s hands.” Furthermore, he 
claimed that he was always against big capital, hoping he could demonstrate 
compatibility with communist anti-capitalism.33 Košak therefore adopted 
the political language of the communist regime, and attempted to show 
the compatibility of his war-time activities with the communist ideology. 
He also tried to whitewash his anti-communist and antisemitic attitudes by 
emphasizing the supposed help he had given to pro-communists and Jews 
during his service in the NDH.34 Košak tried to make his final attempt at 
repenting in the following passage:
I am aware of my guilt, because by helping the NDH, as a mere occupational 
instrument, I directly benefited the occupiers, and I deeply regret it. I got 
into a horrifying company and into a horrible thing [in general], which was 
an instrument of regression, so I do not have any words with which I could 
express my regret and shame [for my actions]. At that time [of the NDH], I 
was not aware of my actions, because I was fooled, that I am actually working 
for the interest of the people, while in reality I was working against them, and I 
would be the happiest and most thankful person, if I would be given a chance, 
to wash this shame with my future work or at least partially wash it [off of 
me].35 
However, Košak’s plea to be given a chance to reintegrate into 
the Yugoslav society failed. He was tried for treason and war crimes and 
executed on June 18, 1947.36 Similar attempts to reinvent his own biography 
and prove that he was not antisemitic were also used by Ivan Perčević,37 
an important member of the pre-war Ustasha movement, and an Ustasha 
official during the NDH. Perčević tried to prove that he had many cousins who 
were Jewish, and that his landlord was also a Jew. He boasted that he had 
helped his landlord to relocate to Italy.38 Perčević also tried to show himself 
in a democratic light by arguing that “for a very long time prior to the [Second 
World] war I sympathized with England and the USA, but the circumstances 
were such that I had to be on the side of the Nazis.”39 Perčević shared the fate 
of Košak, he too was executed in 1947.
31 For more on Vladimir Košak see Dizdar, Tko je tko u NDH, 199. 
32 HR-HDA-1561, SDS, RSUP SRH, 013.0.49 (Vladimir Košak), 63. 
33 HR-HDA-1561, SDS, RSUP SRH, 013.0.49 (Vladimir Košak), 185. 
34 HR-HDA-1561, SDS, RSUP SRH, 013.0.49 (Vladimir Košak), 157.
35 HR-HDA-1561, SDS, RSUP SRH, 013.0.49 (Vladimir Košak), 150.
36 Dizdar, Tko je tko u NDH, 199. 
37 For more on Ivan Perčević (1881-1947) see, Dizdar, Tko je tko u NDH, 315-316. 
38 HR-HDA-1561, SDS, RSUP SRH, 013.0.53 (Ivan Perčević), 55. 
39 HR-HDA-1561, SDS, RSUP SRH, 013.0.53 (Ivan Perčević), 83. 
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In order to prove his ability to integrate into the new Yugoslav society 
Vladimir Židovec went as far to state that 
if a man stands of the materialistic philosophical position, then he must 
foresee the victory of communism over the rotten capitalist society. That is 
because communist materialism is more concerned with the social issues 
which have to be solved, and it is also grounded in science, and therefore 
superior to capitalist materialism. If one stands on a religious position, then 
[…] the victories of communism were created by God’s will.40
 He added that 
whenever someone in emigration mentioned plans about any sort of Kingdom 
of Yugoslavia or about the sub-Danubian bloc of catholic countries, meaning 
the restoration of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, I would always answer, that a 
far better solution for the Croatian people was the contemporary Yugoslavia 
with communist leadership.41 
Vladimir Židovec was executed on March 3, 1948.42
Memoirs 
Although the Yugoslav regime was effective in eliminating the 
Ustasha ideology and its symbolism from the country, many former Ustasha 
members managed to escape and emigrate. Mate Nikola Tokić noted that 
about 12 000 collaborators or anti-communist-oriented Croats found political 
asylum in Germany after the war. Additionally, about 20 000-40 000 managed 
to escape through the so-called ratlines to countries such as Argentina, 
Uruguay, Spain, United States, Canada and Australia.43 At least 7 250 Croat 
émigrés reached Argentina between 1947 and 1949, most of whom held 
positions within the NDH.44 Yugoslav government estimated that between 
10 000 and 12 000 members of anti-communist opposition from the entire 
territory of Yugoslavia reached Argentina by 1949. At least 600 of them 
were classified as war criminals who were wanted for trial by Yugoslavia.45 
However, those wanted for war crimes in Argentina formed only a tiny 
minority compared to the total of 7 812 war criminals which were wanted by 
the authorities of Yugoslavia at the time.46 
Among those Ustashe who arrived to Argentina was Ante Pavelić, 
who performed the role of the charismatic leader of the Ustasha movement 
and the NDH. After his arrival Pavelić continued with his political activities 
trying to further his influence in the emigrant organizations. In 1950 he 
founded the Hrvatska državotvorna stranka [Croatian State-Building Party]. 
Which was seen as an attempt to refashion the Ustasha ideology and to 
show its “democratic turn.” However, some emigrants criticized these 
40 HR-HDA-1561, SDS, RSUP SRH, 013.0.56 (Vladimir Židovec), 175. 
41 HR-HDA-1561, SDS, RSUP SRH, 013.0.56 (Vladimir Židovec), 176.
42 Dizdar, Tko je tko u NDH, 435. 
43 Mate Nikola Tokić, “Landscapes of conflict: unity and disunity in post-second World War 
Croatian émigré separatism,” European Review of History: Revue europeranne d’histoire 16, 
no. 5 (2009): 740-741. 
44 Pino Adriano, Giorgio Cingolani, Nationalism and Terror: Ante Pavelić and Ustasha Terrorism 
from Fascism to the Cold War (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 
2018), 373. 
45 Ibid, 387. 
46 Kisić-Kolanović, “Vrijeme političke represije,” 3. 
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attempts as a façade which was merely hiding Pavelić’s dictatorial zeal. 
This was also corroborated by the Yugoslav secret service which reported 
that by 1952, Pavelić had performed dictatorial powers over the post-war 
emigrant community in Argentina. One of the main instruments in defending 
the Ustasha regime and Ante Pavelić was the newspaper Hrvatska [Croatia] 
which started to be issued in 1947 in Buenos Aires. 47  
However, the post-war Croatian émigré community was not 
monolithic, it was ridden with conflicts and tensions between various 
groups. For example, Ivan Oršanić a prominent Ustasha member who headed 
the Ustasha Youth in the NDH, founded the Hrvatska republikanska stranka 
[Croatian Republican Party] in 1951 in Argentina. The party increasingly 
propagated democratic values, which consequently meant rivaling Pavelić.48 
Vinko Nikolić, another prominent Ustasha member, edited the journal 
Hrvatska Revija [Croatian Review] from 1951. Nikolić allowed the publication 
of numerous articles which were highly critical of the Ustasha regime and 
Ante Pavelić.49 Therefore, these early splinter groups within the Ustasha 
emigrant community provided first platforms to criticize Pavelić and aspects 
of the Ustasha regime publicly – encouraging debate and critical reflection 
of wartime policies. 
One of the most outspoken critics of Ante Pavelić in the émigré 
community was Eugen Dido Kvaternik, the notorious head of the Ustasha 
security apparatus between 1941 and 1942, who managed to escape to 
Argentina after the war.50 For Eugen Dido Kvaternik, there was no doubt that 
Pavelić, together with his close circle of associates, carried the greatest 
responsibility for the downfall of the NDH. He noted:
Being traitors to the basic Croatian interests, sabotaging the organization 
and arming of the military, corruption, orgies and banditry, despicable 
treachery, careerism, power and wealth – doing all this with most horrible 
crimes – ruined the golden opportunity of the 10th of April 1941. Croatia did 
not fall because of the Serbian question. It fell, because the Croatian nation 
tolerated a typically orientalist regime, which committed a horrible treason, 
and to hide this treason, they turned the Ustasha revolution into chaos and 
anarchy.51 
By employing the commonly used accusation of “despotic ruler,” 
which was also used by the Ustashe imprisoned by the Yugoslav regime, 
Eugen Dido Kvaternik tried to downplay the role of the uprising against 
the NDH which was largely a response to his ruthless implementation of 
mass violence. As the head of the entire security apparatus of the NDH 
Dido Kvaternik pursued a policy of national homogenization through ethnic 
cleansing and genocide. He coordinated the persecution of Serbs, Jews and 
47 Delić, “Djelovanje Ante Pavelića 1945.-1953. godine,” 163, 167. 
48 Mario Jareb, “Hrvatska politička emigracija 1928.-1990” [Croatian political emigration 1928-
1990], in Hrvatska politika u XX. stoljeću [Croatian politics in the twentieth century], ed. 
Ljubomir Antić (Zagreb: Matica hrvatska, 2006), 319. 
49 Aleksandra Bednjanec Vuković, “Prilozi o NDH u časopisu ‘Hrvatska revija’ od 1951. Do 1971. 
godine” Časopis za suvremenu povijest, vol. 32, (2000), 95.
50 Dizdar, Tko je tko u NDH, 223-225. 
51 Jere Jareb, Eugen Dido Kvaternik. Sjećanja i zapažanja 1925-1945, Prilozi za hrvatsku povijest 
[Recollections and observations from 1925 to 1945: a contribution to Croatian History], 
(Zagreb: Starčević, 1995.), 287. 
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Roma during the critical period from 1941 to 42 when the genocide against 
these minorities reached its height.52 
The accusations of who precisely betrayed the national struggle 
eventually turned into an open “blame game” among Ustasha members. 
Accusations against each other were published in memoirs, emigrant 
newspapers and in exchanges of personal letters. An extraordinary example 
was the exchange between Ivo Rojnica, a highly ranked Ustasha official who 
governed the area around Dubrovnik during the NDH, and Danijel Crljen,53 who 
was one of the main ideologues of the Ustasha movement, and a staunch 
defender of Pavelić and the Ustasha regime after the war. In 1969 Rojnica 
wrote his memoirs in which he was highly critical of the Ustasha leadership.54 
Danijel Crljen wrote a response to Rojnica in a form of a booklet in which he 
accused Rojnica of tarnishing the reputation of Poglavnik and the NDH and 
serving the interests of Yugoslav propaganda.55 However, the real contention 
between Rojnica and Crljen was the issue of responsibility for the Holocaust 
in the NDH.56 Irritated by Rojnica’s criticism, Crljen published an authentic 
proclamation signed by Rojnica from which it was obvious that Rojnica 
participated in the persecution of the Jews in the NDH. Rojnica responded 
that “if he [Crljen] had any honor, pride, intelligence and honesty he would 
not touch this sensitive question from the war. Let us not forget that we were 
allies with Germany and a member of the Axis, with all its consequences.”57 
However, Rojnica did not follow his own advice and further amped up the 
“blame game” by responding: “I can accuse professor C[rljen], that it was 
him, as a member of the propaganda, who promoted anti-Jewish incidents. 
When he wrote about the Jewish question in 1943[…], he pointed out that the 
[Jewish] question was ‘resolved with thorough persistency’.”58 The exchange 
between Crljen and Rojnica demonstrates how powerful the mechanisms of 
the “blame game” truly were - everything was done in order to preserve the 
positive image of oneself. The result of the exchange is that both individuals 
publicly discussed the topic which was the subject of silencing, and a taboo 
which was not supposed to be debated outside of the closed Ustasha ranks. 
Even Pavelić himself entered into the “blame game”’ politics, by 
arguing that the Ustasha regime was not collaborationist. Pavelić projected 
the blame for collaborationism on National-Socialists within Croatia who 
founded a “party and made up supposed ‘gothic theories’.”59 When faced 
with serious accusations from fellow Ustasha members who criticized him, 
Pavelić’s magazine Hrvatska [Croatia] proclaimed that it “does not enter into 
52 HR-HDA-1561, SDS, 013.0.56. (Židovec), 139-140; HR-HDA-1561, SDS, 013.0.55. (Svježić), 64.
53 For more on Danijel Crljen see Dizdar, Tko je tko u NDH, 72.
54 See Ivo Rojnica, Susreti i doživljaji [Meetings and experiences] (Zagreb: DoNeHa, 1994).
55 Danijel Crljen, Svjedočanstvo [Testimony] (Buenos Aires, 1984), 3; 6; 46. 
56 I will treat the topic of the Holocaust in the memoirs and testimonies of the Ustasha in 
greater detail in a separate article which I intend to publish under the title “The Other Side 
of Holocaust Memory: Antisemitism and the Holocaust in Testimonies and Memoirs of the 
Ustasha Members.” 
57 Ivo Rojnica, Krivotvorenje istine [The Falsification of the Truth] (Munchen and Barcelona: 
Reprinted from “Hrvatska Revija,” 1984), 9.
58 Ibid.
59 Delić, “Djelovanje Ante Pavelića 1945.-1953. godine,” 187.
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any discussions, either based on individual or party-political nature” arguing 
that this would only provide enemies with more ammunition for attacks on 
the Ustashe.60
Some Pavelić’s supporters in emigration employed the explanation 
of foreign stab in the back conspiracy in order to shield the regime and 
Pavelić himself from any responsibility. Danijel Crljen, argued:
…there were multiple intrigues of the Fascist Italy against the NDH and it was 
done continuously. While the Italian Fascists armed Chetniks, and together 
with them conducted raids against the innocent Croatian population, at the 
same time they were calling for the occupation of the second zone based 
on these same raids. Not having any other option but to comply, Poglavnik 
accepted the temporary occupation.61
Crljen argued that the alliance with Italy and Germany was necessary 
for the establishment of the NDH and concluded that Croatia could not make 
peace arrangements with the allies because of the German military power. He 
argued that if Croatia attempted to make peace with the Allies then Germany 
would crush Croatia militarily with a full-blown invasion. Crljen used Warsaw 
as an example of what would have happened to Croatia if they had changed 
sides.62 Prominent Ustasha ministers, who were interned by the British 
forces in camps in Italy immediately after the war, also employed similar 
explanations in order to justify Pavelić’s and their own flight from Croatia:
Germans betrayed A. Pavelić, because they talked him into fleeing [Croatia], 
by arguing that later on we will fight against Russia and communism together 
with the English and the Americans, and yet they [Germans] capitulated.63
The Ustasha memoirs written in emigration show radically different narratives 
as opposed to the ones given in testimonies. Unlike those who were captured 
by the Yugoslav services, the Ustasha members who managed to emigrate 
after the war did not have to abandon their political convictions but to reform 
and readjust them. Ustashe belonging to the so-called second emigration, 
created multiple political organizations which started to replace discredited 
traits of the Ustasha ideology and realigned their ideological core to the 
new Cold War realities. For example, Croatian National Committee (Hrvatski 
narodni odbor, HNO) which was led by a prominent Ustasha member Branimir 
Jelić, was founded in Munich in 1950. The program of the organization stated 
that
 the HNO sets as its primary goal the liberation of Croatia and the re-erection 
of a sovereign Croatian state within its complete ethnic and historical 
territory… [In doing so, the HNO] rejects every form of Totalitarianism, 
including that from the left as well as the right.64 
Therefore the emigrant Ustashe did not only try to reinvent themselves 
through their memoirs, but the Ustasha ideology as such. In the context of 
the Cold War, the emigrant Ustashe tried to realign their ideology to fit the 
newly created Western bloc in which they saw the only chance of resurrecting 
60 Ibid, 188.
61 Crljen, Svjedočanstvo, 12. 
62 Danijel Crljen, Svjedočanstvo II [Testimony II]. (Toronto: Naklada NDH Publishing, 1988),12.
63 HR-HDA-1561, SDS, RSUP SRH, 013.0.56 (Vladimir Židovec), 120.
64 As quoted in Tokić, “Landscapes of conflict,” 741. 
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the NDH. Therefore, the emigrant Ustashe tried to cleanse their ideology of 
discredited political concepts such as totalitarianism and antisemitism. Many 
tried to depict themselves, and their program as democratic in order to fit the 
US-led anti-communist bloc. Therefore, the Ustashe tried to de-fascisticize 
the movement’s ideology. However, they kept their ideological core65 which 
consisted of (1) uncompromising insistence on the independence of Croatia, 
(2) organic nationalism,66 and the belief that these two aims should be 
accomplished through (3) usage of political violence. Due to the fact that 
this ideological core of the movement remained consistent throughout 
the existence of the Ustasha movement, regardless of the most recent 
reinvention of the ideology, Tias Mortigjija suggested that after-war activities 
of the movement should be termed Neo-Ustashaism” (neoustaštvo).67 These 
attempts at reconfiguring the Ustasha ideology by the émigré community 
were a common occurrence among various extreme nationalist and fascist 
movements in the post-war period. Gregorz Rossolinski Liebe, for example, 
mentions that much like the Ustashe, members of the Organization of 
Ukrainian Nationalists, Romanian Iron Guard and Slovakian Hlinka Guard 
all used similar strategies of depicting themselves as victims of Nazism. 
Moreover, together they formed the “Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, which 
united veterans of several East European fascist movements.”68
Even though the Ustasha émigrés suffered the same defeat as 
those captured by the Yugoslav authorities, they went through a radically 
different subjective experience of it. Unlike those captured by the Yugoslav 
authorities the emigrant Ustashe, by and large, were not threatened with 
discrimination, political oppression or imprisonment. Unlike the Ustashe 
who were imprisoned and atomized, emigrants created mutual support 
networks through which they could reaffirm their political attitudes. 
Pavelić’s supporters rejected the defeat and as a consequence resurrected 
the “culture of wartime.”69 They perceived the diaspora life as a temporary 
residence until the new front in the Balkans opens up, for them the war did 
not end in 1945. Unlike the Ustasha critics of Pavelić in Yugoslav captivity, 
the “blame game” among the Ustasha emigration had a completely different 
function. The emigrants’ criticism of Pavelić was not a means to save their 
lives, but a tool used for political power struggle, and for the preservation of 
the reputation of the Croatian nationalist movement.
However, both in the memoirs and the testimonies it is evident that 
the Ustasha members entered a process of exorcising what was perceived 
65 For the concept of ideological core and periphery see Michael Freeden, Ideology: A Very 
Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
66 For the concept of organic nationalism see Michael Mann, The Dark Side of Democracy: 
Explaining Ethnic Cleansing (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 64. 
67 Trpimir Macan, ed., Tias Mortigjija: Moj životopis [Tias Mortigjija: My biography] (Zagreb: 
Nakladni zavod Matice hrvatske, 1996), 96. 
68 Gregorz Rossolinski Liebe, “Inter-Fascist Conflicts in East Central Europe: The Nazis, the 
‘Austrofascists’, the Iron Guard, and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists,” in Fascism 
Without Borders: Transnational Connections and Cooperation between Movements and 
Regimes in Europe from 1918-1945., eds. Arnd Bauerkamper and Gregorz Rossolinski Liebe 
(New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2017), 187. 
69 Horne, “Defeat and Memory in Modern History,” 24. 
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as Satanic in the movement and tried to realign to the new geopolitical 
realities of the Cold War. The dominant prism of self-representation was 
to show themselves as victims of conspiracy, historical circumstances or 
manipulation. The self-victimization took form in three dominant arguments: 
(1) despotic ruler argument, (2) domestic stab in the back and, (3) foreign stab 
in the back argument. This self-victimization was a necessary precondition 
for the reinvention of the self in order to present themselves as innocent.
Conclusion  
The case of the Ustasha movement demonstrates that identification 
of a type of defeat, in this case the total defeat, has led to attempts of major 
reinvention of its past members. However, in order to understand the wide 
array of memories among the Ustashe, it is not the defeat itself, which is the 
defining factor, but the subjective experience of it. Although many Ustashe 
went through similar realities of total defeat, the way they had to cope with 
its consequences after the war differed radically between individuals and 
depended on a variety of factors. The Ustashe strategy for the reinvention 
of the self can be split into two overarching categories: (1) those who were 
captured by the Yugoslav services, and (2) those who managed to emigrate 
after the war. Among members who were imprisoned in Yugoslavia, there 
are subcategories which include (1a) those who tried to reinvent their past in 
order to save their lives and to readjust their narratives in order to potentially 
integrate into the newly formed socialist state. This group mostly included 
mid-ranking Ustasha officials and those who tried to depict themselves 
as technocrats. The second subgroup (1b) consisted of high ranking and 
prominent Ustasha members who presumably understood that the weight 
of evidence against them, or their mere reputation, would prevent them 
from ever being given a chance to reintegrate into the new society. This 
subgroup predominantly tried to demonstrate the purity of their actions and 
present an image of themselves as honorable men. Virtually all captured 
Ustasha members, analyzed in this paper, tried to defend their own individual 
integrity, and all of them criticized the Ustasha regime either in part or in its 
entirety. They did not attempt to defend the Ustashe collectively, nor did they 
show any serious attempts at defending the Ustasha ideology or to reform it 
in the captivity. 
The Ustasha members who managed to emigrate after the war could 
also be classified into two subcategories: (2a) members who were apologists 
of the regime and Ante Pavelić; and opposing them were the (2b) members 
who blamed Pavelić and his close circle for all the misdeeds of the NDH. This 
classification explains the division between those who criticized the regime 
(6/12 memoirs) and Pavelić (5/12 memoirs). Apologists of Pavelić attributed 
full responsibility for war crimes, as well as the movement’s defeat, on either 
irresponsible individuals or the Axis powers. Pavelić’s opponents (2b) were 
mostly adherents of the despotic ruler argument according to which Pavelić 
and his close circle of associates had tainted the image of the Ustasha 
movement and Croatian nationalism. Nevertheless, members of both 
subgroups actively pursued a narrative which allowed for the reinvention 
of themselves, of the Ustasha movement, and of its history, in order to 
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preserve its legacy. However, critics of Pavelić in emigration (2b) thought 
that reorganization and acceptance of “neo-Ustashaism” could only function 
if they got rid of Pavelić who was seen as being too compromised to head 
the movement in the new geopolitical context of the Cold War. If Pavelić’s 
opponents wanted to rid themselves of the stigma of totalitarianism, they 
had to criticize its single most visible symbol, the leader of the movement 
itself. They tried to demonstrate that the totalitarian nature of Pavelić’s rule 
absolved them of any criminal guilt, ultimately depicting themselves as new 
victims at the hands of Poglavnik. 
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